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1 
Ready to Become a Great Power? 






Rising nationalism in 2008 has marked the turning point in China’s evolving national identity. This 
most recent wave of nationalism shows that, as China rises as a great power, the Chinese people’s 
perceptions about their national identity are challenged by a number of issues that need to be 
addressed. The transformation of the Chinese national identity is influenced by both the Chinese 
government and the public. The Chinese government plays a leading role in constructing a national 
identity that complements its cultural diplomacy and serves China’s core national interests. Meanwhile, 
the public also contributes to the forging of the national identity through expressing  its views and 
demands in this regard. It is of great importance for people to understand China’s emerging new 
national identity in dealing with this rising power. 
 





The year 2008 marked the rise of a new wave of Chinese nationalism triggered by a 
series of events, including the Western media’s distorted report on the March 14th Tibet 
Incident and the attacks on the Olympic flame in the London and Paris legs of the torch relay. 
Those events instigated widespread internet protests against the major Western media outlets, 
including the BBC and CNN, and led to the boycott of the French retailer Carrefour in major 
cities in China. The momentum of the popular nationalist movement accelerated in 2009 
with the online protests against Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama and Christie’s 
auction of the bronze zodiac animal heads looted from the Yuanmin Garden by the French 
and British armies back in 1860. This rise of nationalist sentiment culminated with the 
publication of Unhappy China: The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges in March 
2009, which instantly become a national sensation.  
When China’s rising has caused strong reverberation around the world, the rise of neo-
nationalism in China attracted much attention from the public, academia and policy makers 
in the West. During a TV interview, Evan Osnas, the New Yorker magazine’s residential 
correspondent in Beijing, noted that the most frequently asked question about China during 
his lecture tour in the U.S. was about the nationalist sentiment in China.1
This paper argues that the Chinese national identity is undergoing major changes: the 
Chinese people are casting off the identity of being the victim of foreign oppression and 
 In fact, the recent 
outburst of popular nationalism echoes China’s rising as a major world power and directly 
addresses  the key issues that China needs to tackle as it seeks to become a great power. It 
additionally signifies the fundamental transformation of the Chinese people’s perceptions of 
their national identity.  
                                                          
1 Evans Osnas, interview by Q & A, CSPAN, broadcast on May 3, 2009, 10:30 PM (Central Time).  
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taking on the new identity of a great power. This new national identity seeks the prestige of a 
major power that is rooted in the Chinese civilization and culture. While the government in 
China plays a predominant role in shaping this new national identity, the public also 
contributes to the process by voicing its nationalist sentiment and participating in nationalist 
movements. This paper further argues that China is at a crucial stage in adjusting its role in 
the international community. Such adjustments could deeply affect the future of the 
international system.  
This paper first analyzes the nationalist movement that occurred between 2008 and 2009 
and discusses the key elements in forging a new national identity, as reflected by this 
movement; it then studies the role of the Chinese government and public in formulating the 
national identity, especially the government’s strategy and policies in this regard. The paper 
concludes by analyzing the trajectory of the transformation of Chinese national identity and 
its implication for China’s foreign policy in the near future.  
 
 
2. THE RECENT WAVE OF NATIONALISM 
 
To the Chinese people, the year 2008 was an eventful year – the March 14th Tibetan 
Incident caused widespread reverberation and led to the West’s protests against China’s 
hosting the Olympic Games. In May, the earthquake in Sichuan resulted in more than 80,000 
casualties. Recovering from the shock and grief of this devastating disaster, China hosted the 
Olympic Games successfully, fulfilling its long-cherished dream. This chain of events deeply 
affected Chinese emotions and gave rise to the most recent wave of the popular nationalist 
movement both at home and abroad.  
What triggered the nationalist movement in 2008 was the Western media’s report of the 
March 14 Tibet Incident. A picture posted on the CNN website, showing a group of people 
running in front of a military vehicle on the streets of Lhasa, was found to have been 
deliberately edited to remove the image of a person throwing stones at a peaceful Chinese 
policeman. This discovery immediately spread throughout the internet and evoked wide 
protests on the web. On the internet, Chinese netizens and overseas Chinese launched protest 
campaigns and posted their own videos to spread the truth. The Xinhua Net, the official 
website run by the Xinhua News Agency, criticized the reports of some Western media 
because they did not “conform to the facts”(Xinhua News Agency, 2008). In the discussion 
rooms and bulletin boards of major Chinese internet portals like www.sina.com and the 
China Daily website, netizens collectively roared with the question “CNN, what’s wrong 
with you?” Likewise, within a few days, the quote “Man should never act as low as CNN” 
had become a very popular saying on the web (China Daily 2008) – a satirical remark used 
by people when they make negative comments about others’ behaviors.  
It was soon revealed that CNN was not the only media outlet that was not telling the truth 
– quite a number of other newspapers and TV stations in the West distorted or even 
fabricated the facts about the Tibetan incident in one way or another. As a result, Chinese 
netizens became indignant and in response, quickly disclosed information about how some of 
the Western media had been using false information in their reports (sina.com, April 03, 
2008). Meanwhile, anti-CNN and anti-BBC websites were created by Chinese netizens and 
overseas Chinese. The netizens voiced their disappointment about how biased and unfair 
Western media could be when reporting events in China, because of the deep rooted 
misunderstanding of and prejudice against China. The netizens also criticized the Western 




media for their “unethical” behavior and deliberate negligence with regard to facts, despite 
the media’s claims to maintain “objectivity” and “professionalism.” On YouTube and other 
major Chinese websites, videos made by Chinese netizens about Tibet reiterated China’s 
sovereignty over Tibet and tried to reveal the distorted images of Tibet portrayed by the 
Western media. 
The nationalist action did not stop at the internet sphere. When the Olympic torch relay 
was going through Paris, the Chinese Paralympics athlete Jin Jing, who was bound to a 
wheelchair, was attacked by a protestor for Tibet independence. Infuriated, the Chinese 
netizens advocated boycotting French products. In China, the French retailer Carrefour has 
become a particularly prominent target due to its perceived backing of Tibetan independence 
(Kolhammer, 2008). Outside China, in almost all the major cities along the route of the 
Olympics torch relay, people from overseas Chinese communities went out to welcome the 
torch bearers, waving Chinese national flags and banners and chanting the national anthem to 
demonstrate their support for China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games.  
After the Olympic Games, in December 2008, when France was holding the rotating EU 
presidency, French President Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama in Poland. The meeting had 
evoked strong protest from the Chinese government and furthered the nationalist movement 
in China. The Chinese Premier, Wen Jiaobao, cancelled his visit to the Sino-EU summit 
scheduled in Lyon that month, and the Sino-French relations were faced with severe 
challenges. Further, in early 2009, when Wen Jiabao undertook his European tour, France 
was not included. The Chinese state media called Wen Jiabao’s visit a “trip of confidence,” 
since Wen’s tour had demonstrated China’s influence as a major power in a time of world 
financial crisis. The Chinese netizens nicknamed Wen Jiabao’s visit to Europe the “Grand 
Tour around France” (huanfai luxing) in the satirical sense, as this term in Chinese can be 
literally used to describe the well-known European road cycling stage races – the Grand Tour 
or “Tour de France.” 
In February 2009, Christie’s decided to auction two bronze zodiac heads looted by the 
British and French imperialist armies in 1860 that most recently belonged to the collection of 
Yves Saint Laurent and Pierre Berge. Once more, Sino-French ties became a hot topic on the 
internet (Zhou 2009). Art stolen from China during the age of imperialist plunder had always 
been an emotional issue in China that aroused indignant patriotism (Kraus 2004: 196). In the 
eyes of many Chinese, the repatriation of national treasures is an act to remove the past 
humiliation and thus an emblem of China’s rising as a strong nation. This event caused the 
Chinese netizens to direct their anger at both Christie’s and the French government, 
criticizing the latter for stealing the Chinese ancient treasure and doing nothing to redress the 
wrongdoings. The wave of the nationalist movement reached its crest when, in March 2009, 
a book entitled Unhappy China was published. As a follow-up of China Can Say No, a book 
filled with nationalist sentiment published in 1996, the first print of Unhappy China was 
70,000 copies, and within two weeks, the publishers had increased the print to 200,000 
copies (sina.com March 24, 2009). This number continued to increase, and within one month, 
a total of 600,000 copies were sold.  
 
 
3. CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TRANSFORMATION 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the communist ideology losing its appeal, nationalism 
has moved to the center stage of the Chinese political scene. Nationalism is used by the 
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government to claim the royalty of the Chinese people (Zhao 2005: 134) and to rally their 
support to achieve the agenda of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. At the same time, popular 
nationalism has been on the rise since the 1990s, marked by major events like the protest 
against the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of the 
U.S. EP3 spy plane with the Chinese military aircraft in 2001, and the anti – Japanese 
protests in 2005. The most recent wave of nationalism demonstrated that the transformation 
of the Chinese national identity is at a crucial historical juncture, especially with regards to 
the Chinese people’s perception about the nation’s role in the world. It also shows that while 
China is taking on the new national identity of a great power. Yet it has to tackle a number of 
key issues.  
National identity refers to the perceptions of the state and its people about the nation’s 
role in the international system. Samuel S. Kim has pointed out the importance of national 
identity on international relations: “The identity of a state (national identity), more than 
anything else, provides a cognitive framework for shaping its interests, preferences, 
worldview, and consequent foreign policy actions. An understanding of this identity will 
therefore contribute to more accurate accounts of state behavior” (Kim 2003: 41). Dimitter 
and Kim have discussed how a nation-state’s identity is defined by its role in the world: “We 
have argued that the substantive content of national identity is the state and that the state 
defines itself by what role it plays – by self-categorization in alignment with positive 
reference groups and in opposition to negative reference groups – by its performance in the 
international arena” (Dittmer and Kim 1993: 17). Peter Gries has also pointed out the 
following: “Chinese national identity evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and 
the past” (Gries 2004b: 19). 
More specifically, Townsend has argued that “China’s entry into a world of sovereign 
nation-states was unusually prolonged and traumatic because it forced the Chinese to reject 
their age-old cultural identity and to adopt a new politicized one …. and this long, wrenching 
‘identity crisis’ makes contemporary Chinese nationalism unusually intense, becoming in the 
resolution of the crisis something like the religion of modern China” (Townsend 1996: 5). 
China was traditionally regarded as an aggrieved power (Pollack 2005: 330) due to the 
“hundred year of humiliation” imposed by the imperialism. After the founding of the PRC, 
China’s national identity was mainly defined by political ideology as being a member of the 
“third world.” 
During the past three decades since the reform, the Chinese people have been grappling 
with an evolving national identity. This identity is, for the most part, constructed by the 
government in accordance with its grand strategy of modernization. While Deng Xiaoping 
urged China to catch up with the West through the modernization drive, he also insisted that 
China should keep a low profile in international arena. Deng’s famous doctrine, buyao 
dangtou (“do not seek leadership”), “repeatedly warned his successors against actively 
seeking leadership in global and regional affairs and shouldering responsibilities that China 
cannot bear” (Zhang and Tang 2005: 49). Deng’s “developmental nationalism”(Chang 2001: 
151) prevailed in the 1990s, as the Chinese government put great emphasis on the 
importance of developing cooperative relations with major powers and tried to rein in 
popular nationalism (Zhao 2005: 134). Under these circumstances, most people believe that 
China still remains a developing country – given that it lags far behind the developed nations 
in terms of per capita income (Chan 2005: 697-8) and still has a problem of the huge 
disparity between the developed eastern coastal areas and the less developed western 
hinterland – despite the fact that China has registered the highest economic growth rate in the 





The year 2008 was the turning point in the transformation of the perceptions of the 
Chinese people regarding their national identity. China was at an important historical 
juncture: the year marked the 30th anniversary of its reform and opening up. As some 
Western scholars have observed, “Beginning in the late 1970s, China experienced three 
decades of extraordinary growth that raised every indicator of material welfare, lifted 
hundreds of millions from poverty, and propelled China from near autarky into regional and 
global prominence” (Keller and Rawski 2007: 3). Hosting the Olympics was also regarded as 
a hallmark of China’s economic achievements, and many in China cited the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympic Games as a parallel to suggest that China had risen as one of the world’s leading 
economies, just as Japan rose to become one of the world’s leading economies after the 1964 
Tokyo Olympic Games. In fact, it was in 2008 that China overtook Germany to become the 
world’s third largest economy. 
Today, “China also seems to be shedding its traditional twin identities of historical victim 
and object of great power manipulation” (Shambaugh 2005: 25). China’s nationalism, which 
is derived from both the pride in Chinese civilization and the past humiliation of being 
bullied by the West, is now dominated by the aspiration to rejuvenate the Chinese nation and 
make China rise again as a world power. The emerging new Chinese national identity is 
constructed on this “Chinese Dream.” However, although China is no longer a “victim,” its 
path to becoming a major power will not necessarily be a smooth one. The recent outburst of 
nationalism has revealed some of the major challenges in the transformation of the national 
identity. There are three major issues that concern the Chinese public with regard to China’s 
great power status: as a great power, China seeks recognition and respect from other nations; 
as a great power, China needs to extend its influence in the normative sphere and have a 
bigger voice in the international community; as a great power, China will not tolerate any 
challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
 
 
4. EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES: KEY ISSUES IN FORGING CHINA’S NEW 
NATIONAL IDENTITY  
 
4.1. Different Perceptions Regarding the Rise of China 
 
Ng-Quinn remarked that while a nation-state’s identity is “collectively constructed by its 
members,” it is “a function of …the state’s changing interaction with other states. Therefore, 
discrepancies between internal and external expectations and realities may cause identity 
confusion or even crises” (Ng-Quinn 1993: 32-3). Kim has also remarked that “a state actor 
in the international system understands other states based on the identity it ascribes to them, 
and it often responds accordingly” (Kim 2003: 41). In one word, a state develops perceptions 
about its national identity through its interactions with other states and by drawing references 
from how other states view it. In fact, China’s national identity is profoundly influenced by 
its interaction with the world’s powerful states and their perceptions of China.  
While today the Chinese people are expecting respect from the West and looking forward 
to the profound elevation of China’s international status, the reality is that the West’s 
perceptions about China’s rising are incongruent with such expectations. The chain of events 
that occurred in 2008 and 2009 has highlighted such discrepancies. While the Chinese people 
are becoming increasingly confident about their international status, they are also confronted 
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with and frustrated by the distrust and prejudice from the West. The most recent wave of 
nationalism is the response to such external pressure.  
The negative portrayal of China’s rising has been especially prevalent among the status 
quo powers – represented by the U.S. and other Western countries like Germany and France, 
and Japan in East Asia. Many have drawn parallels of China’s rising with some of the 
twentieth century’s most disruptive international actors – Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, 
Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union (Goldstein 2003: 61). In East Asia, “the Japanese 
public increasingly views China as a threat and supports the assertive stance of political 
leaders like Prime Minister Koizumi toward it” (Shirk 2007: 145). 
Almost ten years ago, Western observers of Chinese nationalism found that “whatever 
nationalism there is in China today is reactive, in the sense of a historical grievance and 
resentment at the humiliation Chinese endured under Western and Japanese imperialism 
[emphasis in original] (Chang 2001: 179). However, after ten years, fundamental changes 
have taken place as the Chinese people are becoming increasingly confident about their 
country. According to the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China, “the Chinese people 
express extraordinary levels of satisfaction with the way things are going in their country. 
These findings represent a dramatic improvement in national contentment from earlier in the 
decade when the Chinese people were not nearly as positive about the course of their nation 
and its economy” (The Pew Research Center 2008). Subsequently, the Chinese perception of 
the nation’s status in the world has changed profoundly. As one author observed in the late 
1990s, “increasingly confident and self-assured, China is now rightfully feeling safe as a 
nation. Many of its people believe that a rejuvenation of Chinese civilization is approaching” 
(Wang Feiling 1999: 21-2). Chinese scholars also have admitted that “China has become an 
insider in the international system, and “China is now turning from a regional to a world 
power”  (Shirk 2007: 107). 
People in China also hold very different perceptions from the West regarding their 
emerging new national identity. Contrary to the “China threat” theory, many in China view 
their rising as peaceful and believe that it will cause no harm to the other nations. Zhao has 
quoted Yan Xuetong, a famous Chinese scholar on nationalism as saying “the rise of China 
is and will be peaceful” because China is seeking national rejuvenation and “the Chinese 
regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than as obtaining 
something new … The Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration of fairness rather 
than as gaining advantages over others” (Zhao 2004: 250). Foreign scholars like Goldstein 
shared similar views. Goldstein compared today’s China to Germany under Otto von 
Bismarck and argued that China is “a nationalist rising power whose interests sometimes 
conflict with others’ but one that so far lacks any obvious ambition or reason to indulge a 
thirst for international expansion, let alone dominance” (Goldstein 2003: 63). 
As Yu Bin has pointed out, “Unlike Chinese nationalism of the past, coming when the 
country was weak and divided, contemporary Chinese nationalism is rising along with the 
growing Chinese power” (Yu 1999: 197). With China becoming economically more 
powerful, it becomes increasingly important for the nation to be respected and reckoned by 
other nations, especially the status quo powers. The most recent wave of nationalism not 
only aimed at condemning the “wrong doings” committed by the Western media, but also 
rectifying the biased perceptions of China and establishing a new image of a China that is 
dignified and inviolable.  
 
 





4.2. The Right to Expression  
 
The 2008 Olympic Games and issue of Tibet have caught the attention of the Chinese 
public because they have important implications for China’s new identity. The symbolic 
value of China’s hosting the Olympic Games cannot be over-exaggerated. By hosting the 
Olympic Games, China was able to recover its past glory and be recognized by the 
international community as a powerful and important nation. At the same time, as Hughes 
has pointed out, “With Beijing scheduled to hold the summer Olympic Games in 2008, it 
seems that a growing degree of ‘soft power’ has secured China’s place in the global cultural 
system, too” (Hughes 2006: 1). Therefore, any kind of obstruction of China’s hosting the 
Olympic Games is regarded as a challenge to China’s aspiration to become a world power, 
an act of belittling Chinese friendliness towards the world.  
To most Chinese people, China’s new international status as a great power not only 
requires recognition from other countries, but also should give China the power to express its 
own ideas and values and justify its causes. The protest against the distorted report on Tibet 
is a case in point. Disappointed by the West’s reaction to the rise of China, the Chinese 
public is eager to speak to the international community about China’s views on those issues 
that are fundamental to China’s national interests.  
It is not the first time that the media in the West has instigated the indignation of the 
Chinese people because of biased reporting. One scholar has observed that “the U.S. media 
have played a large role in U.S.-China relations; during the mid-1990s, it stimulated rather 
than smoothed out the turbulence between the two countries (Zhang 1999: 155).”  Even 
though some policy-makers in the U.S. tended to adopt a moderate approach towards the 
rising of China,2
The Chinese public was angered by CNN’s report because it denigrated the image of 
China. Susan Shirk has remarked that “a nation’s reputation is clearly very important,’ just as 
important as its economic or military power (Shirk 2007: 98).” Gries has also emphasized the 
importance of “saving face” and “maintaining face” in China’s dealings with other nations 
(Gries 2004b: 22, 28) and pointed out that the Chinese people cared very much about 
foreigners’ view about China because of the “collective self-esteem” (Ibid. 19). For a nation 
that has been subject to a hundred years of humiliation, the ability to command the respect of 
the international community is an indispensible element in defining the identity of being a 
great power. The 2008 nationalist movement sent out a clear message that China should no 
longer tolerate the dominance of international public opinion by the Western media and that, 
as a big power, China should speak more loudly about its views.  
 such thinking does not often reach the Chinese public. To the Chinese 
people, the Western media represents the prevalent Western view about the rise of China, a 
view that is deeply rooted in ideological prejudice and the fear that China is challenging the 
world order that used to be dominated by the West.  
As a result, the netizens and street protestors have made great effort to demonstrate to the 
world how they really feel about the issue of Tibet. In recent years, the so-called “Tibetan 
fever” has spread in the West (Wang Lixiong 2002: 164),  and, with regard to the protest 
                                                          
2 Some of the policy-makers’ views on U.S. foreign policy towards China are demonstrated in the panel 
conference entitled “The U.S. Foreign Policy towards China” sponsored by the Committee of 100 
attended by the Director and former Directors of the National Security Council in May, 2009. The 
program was broadcast on C-SPAN II on May 4, 2009. 
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against the Chinese policy towards Tibet, the non-official opposition is even more prevalent 
and intense than the official opposition (Wang Lixiong 1999). To reach out to a wider 
audience, the netizens not only established anti-CNN and anti-BBC websites, but also posted 
videos on the YouTube to defend China’s sovereign rights over Tibet. Overseas Chinese 
students held gatherings on campus or in the street to talk about the Tibet issue. Young 
people in Beijing held up posters in front of Carrefour, showing what has happened in Tibet. 
These actions were aimed at breaking down the Western media’s monopoly over the 
discussion of those controversial issues. By asserting the “right to expression,” ordinary 
Chinese people are trying to help their country to assert its role as a major power in the 
international community. 
 
4.3. Territorial Integrity as a Key Element of the Chinese National Identity 
 
Ever since the late 19th century, the goal of Chinese nationalism has been to “enrich the 
country and strengthen the army” (fu guo qiang bin), a goal that has been embraced by 
various political forces in China. The Chinese national identity that is based on this ideal has 
put much emphasis on China’s ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous saying that “a nation is bound to be bullied if it lags behind the other 
nations” explicitly expressed the idea that defending China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity is the primary goal of China’s modernization drive. Two fundamental tasks of the 
Chinese government since 1978 are the “reunification with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan 
and the avoidance of national disintegration by quenching separatism in Tibet, Xinjiang, 
Inner Mongolia and elsewhere” (Guo 2004: 43). For many Chinese officials and scholars, 
“national interests are the embodiment of the nation as a whole, and their pursuit is the 
natural and ‘inalienable right’ of the nation-state” (Deng 1999: 50). Therefore, “To many 
ordinary Chinese people … the West’s criticism on China’s stance on Tibet and issues that 
directly concern the territorial integrity is regarded as an evil design of  ‘divide and conquer,’ 
an old trick in the past used by the former colonial powers to constrain the rise of China” 
(Shirk 2007: 106). 
A vision shared by many Chinese people is that now that China has become stronger, it 
will be more capable of defending its territory. On the internet , one of the most frequently 
quoted sayings is a remark made by a Chinese general in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 
A.D.): “One who dares to provoke the Han, no matter how far away he is, he will be chased 
after and demolished.” This saying has revealed the netizens’ nostalgic feeling for the 
strength of the Chinese empire and their resolve to defend its territorial integrity. On the 
other hand, it also shows that the Chinese people’s perception of China’s identity as a rising 
great power emphasizes the maintenance of its territory, rather than territorial expansion.  
Discussing China’s military modernization, Takamine remarked that such modernization 
“can be understood partly as a psychological defense mechanism, underpinned by the harsh 
reality of China’s modern history” (Takamine 2005: 442-3). The recent nationalist sentiment 
over Tibet, Diaoyu Island and territorial disputes in the South China Sea has demonstrated 
that the Chinese national identity is grounded in the integrity of the Chinese nation – in terms 
of culture, territory and people, especially as China becomes more powerful and has more 
leverage in world affairs. The issue of Tibet has instigated widespread reaction among the 
Chinese people, because, due to China’s past experience of being divided and humiliated by 
the Western powers, the majority of the Chinese people firmly believe that the rejuvenation 
of China cannot be achieved without retaining its national unity and territorial integrity.  





5. FORGING THE NEW IDENTITY: THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC 
 
The national government of a state always plays an important role in forging the national 
identity. Whiting has argued that the “national identity [of China] emerges in how the policy-
making elite perceives and articulates the image of China in its relationship to the world” 
(Guo 2004: 10). Nieto also mentioned the role played by the Communist Party in shaping the 
national identity. He remarked, “The Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party 
have promoted over the course of time a ‘state version of identity’, i.e., certain actions 
originating from the state tending to produce a political-ideological sense of national 
belonging inside or outside its frontiers” (Nieto 2003: 180).  
In China, the government takes the leading role in formulating the national identity 
through defining its grand strategy in international relations, implementing foreign policies, 
and propagating the government’s perceptions about the role of the nation to the public. By 
promoting the official version of patriotism, i.e., the “state nationalism,” the government 
unites the people under the nation-state, a political territorial unit, and makes people believe 
that “party rule and a strong state are of paramount importance in maintaining national 
autonomy, unity and identity” (Guo 2003: 18). State-nationalism represents the collective 
interests of the whole populace (Chang 2001: 180), and it also gives the government more 
legitimacy and power over the nation (Baum 2003: 25; Mochizuki 2005: 137). State-
nationalism is often used as a vehicle to transmit the government’s perception about the role 
of China in the international arena and to rally the support from the people to build such an 
identity. However, while China has been increasingly integrated into the global community, 
the Chinese people have been able to develop their own perceptions about the national 
identity that are more diversified than the national identity sponsored by the state. The 
interaction between the government and the public has greatly influenced the nature of the 
emerging national identity.  
The Chinese government sets the basic tone about China’s role in the world. Since the 
economic reform of 1978, nationalist sentiment has replaced the political ideology and 
become the most salient ideological power that holds the Chinese nation together. The 
Chinese government has effectively employed the ideal of reinvigorating China to rally the 
popular support. Molding a national identity would help the state to better unify the people 
and justify its foreign policies.  
In the past, the national education system and state media “have conditioned the broader 
Chinese public to think of China as a long-suffering target of depredations and pressures 
from outside powers” (Sutter 2005: 289-305, 291). During the nationalist campaign launched 
by the government in the early 1990s, the government instilled the idea that with the end of 
the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, China had 
become the target of the sabotage by the West headed by the U.S. (Guo 2004: 27). However, 
with the deepening of the market reform and the further integration of the Chinese economy 
into the global economy, the idea of an opposition between China and the West rooted in 
ideological differences has been gradually replaced by the view that China is becoming an 
important and responsible power in the international community.  
The official-sponsored national identity is carved out of the pragmatic considerations in 
accordance with China’s grand strategy – which is to secure a peaceful international 
environment for its economic development. Maintaining a high economic growth rate is the 
key to China’s domestic stability and its international strength. It will also enable China to 
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solve the issue of Taiwan and to maintain its territorial integrity by fending off the 
secessionist movement in Tibet and Xingjiang. For the Chinese leaders, it is not China’s goal 
to seek fundamental changes in the international system by challenging the predominance of 
the U.S. Gill has remarked that since the early 21th century, the Chinese foreign policy has 
been moving away from the reactive ‘victimhood’ complex to identify more closely with ‘a 
great power mentality’ in regional and global affairs by adopting a “more ‘mature,’ 
‘constructive,’ and ‘responsible’ great power diplomacy” (Gill 2005: 247). To serve China’s 
core national interests (guojia hexing liyi) the Chinese government tries to keep a low profile 
and act as a responsible power, although on many international issues it has become more 
assertive than before.  
Even though the Chinese government has chosen up to now to adhere to the foreign 
policy designated by Deng Xiaoping, a policy that focuses on maintaining peace for China’s 
modernization drive, this does not mean that the Chinese government is not trying to extend 
its influence. On the contrary, the Chinese government has been very conscious about 
creating a new national identity that can further China’s international influence by adapting 
to the changing international system. This new national identity is no longer constructed on 
political ideology, but built on the Chinese tradition and culture.  
Under Communism, “collective identity through ‘unification of thought’ and a centralist 
state require each other” (Meissner 2003: 212). Now, since it is increasingly difficult to 
achieve a “unification of thought” through the indoctrination of political ideologies, the 
Chinese government has been trying to resuscitate Confucianism and to integrate some of its 
core values into the current policy guidelines. As Copper pointed out, the Chinese political 
culture is highly moralist in that political decision-making is seen as ethical in nature 
(Copper 2007: 81). By assuming the role of the guardian of the heritage of the Chinese 
civilization, the Chinese government is constructing the identity of a peaceful rising power 
that emphasizes the traditional Chinese value of “universal harmony.” 
Building the national identity on the Chinese cultural tradition has other advantages. As 
demonstrated by the most recent wave of nationalism, the emerging new Chinese national 
identity is an identity that is able to attract and encompass most ethnic Chinese in the world. 
Some authors have pointed out the importance of the shared “collective cultural memory” 
(Guo 2004: 33) and the sense of belonging to the same ethnic community among the 
overseas Chinese (Nieto 2003: 178). According to Neito, this cultural and racial belonging 
has become an important component of the Chinese national identity among overseas 
Chinese people (Ibid.). Townsend has identified four “Chinese nations,” one of which 
“includes Chinese elsewhere around the world who retain some idea of dual nationality” 
(Townsend 2004: 16).  
This kind of national identity has become more powerful when as China is rising as a 
major power. The so-called “centripetal” power of the Chinese culture has made the ethnic 
Chinese living abroad render their support to the cause of China’s revitalization. Being very 
well aware of the power of the Chinese culture, the Chinese government has been trying to 
promote China’s new national identity as a time-honored civilization turning into a major 
power. Since the reform and opening up, the Chinese government has been paying great 
attention to connecting with the overseas ethnic Chinese and enhancing their sense of 
cultural belonging. Chinese leaders often visit the leaders of the overseas Chinese 
communities during their state-trips. Chinese representatives in the embassies often 
participate in community events and at times give speeches about the political and economic 
situation in China (Nieto 2003: 183). To reach out to the overseas Chinese community, in 




2004 the Chinese government established Chinese satellite TV services in a number of 
foreign countries, although some in China are still urging that more work needs to be done in 
this regard (Nanfang Weekend March 5, 2009).  
This culture-based national identity has enabled Chinese nationalism to go beyond the 
national border and to mobilize both the Chinese nationals living in foreign countries and 
overseas Chinese. The overseas Chinese not only contribute to China’s national cause 
through extensive economic ties, especially investment, but also help China to further its 
political influence. The power of the nationalism has been demonstrated by the overseas 
Chinese communities’ widespread support for the Olympic torch relay and their fervent 
response to the distorted news report. In this sense, developing a national identity becomes 
an effective means for China to project its soft power.  
On the other hand, a new national identity serves well China’s need to reduce the tension 
caused by its very rise in the international arena. It also helps China to consolidate its status 
as a major power by furthering its influence in the normative sphere. Shambaugh has 
remarked, “Beijing does seem to exert some influence in at least two areas. The first is in the 
normative realm, where Beijing’s enunciation of the ‘new security concept,’ ‘strategic 
partnerships,’ and other initiatives to fashion a new set of norms to govern interstate relations 
and prevent conflict resonates positively among many Asian nations” (Shambaugh 2005: 25). 
In 2002 the Chinese government put forward the concept of a “peaceful rise.” In his speech 
at the 2004 Boao Forum, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao referenced China’s ancient 
“tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness, and trust toward the neighbors” and that “we 
pursue a policy of bringing harmony, security, and prosperity to neighbors” (Shirk 2007: 
109). China is trying hard to promote the image of a rising power that has a unique value 
system which place great emphasis on peace and harmony.  
Since the 1990s, China’s growing economic strength has enabled it to create a favorable 
international image. China’s responsible behavior in holding stable the value of the renminbi 
(RMB) during the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis has won wide applause from 
Asian countries (Lampton 2005: 307). The active role China played in promoting free trade 
agreements with ASEAN nations is also seen favorably as an effort to create “win-win” 
situations between China and the countries in the Southeast Asian region. At the Beijing 
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, China exempted 10.9 billion 
yuan (about 1.36 billion US dollars) worth of debt held by 31 heavily indebted and least 
developed African countries. The 2009 Chinese Foreign Policy White Paper proposed that 
economic diplomacy and cultural diplomacy should become the focus of China’s diplomatic 
work (sina.com January 20, 2009). All these efforts of the Chinese government testify that 
China is working very hard to influence the perceptions of foreign countries by relying more 
on its economic leverage.  
The Chinese government is playing a leading role in shaping the new national identity 
through the implementation of foreign policies; at the same time, it is also capable of 
influencing the perceptions of the ordinary people through education and propaganda. The 
2008 Olympic Games is a good example that shows how the government has defined the 
official version of the national identity and made the public adopt similar perceptions. In a 
press release during the Second Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress in 
March 2009, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi remarked that the 2008 Olympic Games was a 
major cultural events and part of the government’s efforts to promote cultural diplomacy. He 
also pointed out: “For a long time before the Games, great efforts have been made by the 
government to educate the people about the significance of the Olympic Games” (Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of China 2009). 
As to the interaction between the Chinese government and the public in creating a new 
national identity, one also needs to note that the government and the public share the 
aspiration of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and both tend to adopt the realists’ 
perspective regarding foreign affairs issues. The public almost always tends to side with the 
government when people find that China’s great power status is being challenged by 
outsiders. This attitude also explains why the Chinese nationalists felt so strongly about the 
incidents surrounding the Olympic torch relay. While the Chinese nationalists advocate 
China’s “right to expression” (hua yu quan), their action is in line with the government’s 
policy to extend China’s cultural influence by establishing new norms in the international 
community. 
However, the public does not always agree with the government on various foreign 
policy issues, especially when it comes to China’s role in world affairs. Nowadays, although 
the government is taking the leading role in shaping the Chinese national identity, ordinary 
citizens are also contributing to the process by voicing their opinions and participating in 
various nationalist movements. For example, the neo-nationalists demanded that the 
government take more assertive stances on China’s territorial disputes with other countries. 
Many also voiced their doubts about the “keeping a low profile” foreign policy guideline. As 
one internet chat room posting said, China should “behave strongly [and] not only behave 
friendly to people … to be a responsible great power we have to hold a rose in one hand and 
a gun in the other, in many circumstances to oppose and revenge” (Shirk 2007: 139).  
Since the 1990s the Chinese government has become increasingly subject to domestic 
constraints and responsive to popular nationalism. Since the legitimacy of the Chinese 
government lies in its ability to achieve high economic growth and safeguard the country, the 
government needs to convince the public that it is fully capable of defending the national 
interests. The 2008 nationalist movement has made the Chinese government more conscious 
of and ready to respond to the popular sentiment. Regarding the protest against the foreign 
media’s report of the Tibet incident, some believed that the young people’s quick action of 
boycotting the Carrefour directly caused the Chinese government to cold-shoulder the French 
leaders at the 2009 Davos Forum.  
Between 2008 and 2009 there has been heated discussion on the internet about the 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and a number of countries 
including Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The Chinese government has taken quick 
actions and become more proactive to address issues concerning China’s maritime territories. 
At the end of 2008, the Chinese government sent navy ships to patrol in the high seas near 
Somalia to protect the Chinese merchant ships from the pirates; and in April 2009, the 
Chinese government launched the largest-ever marine inspection in the South China Sea by 
sending marine inspection vessels to conduct regular patrolling in that region. In June 2009, 
against the opposition of Vietnam, the Chinese government imposed a fishing ban on the 
South China Sea, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman remarked that China has 
"indisputable" sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, including Xisha and Nansha 
islands, and their adjacent waters (People’s Daily Online June 9, 2009). These events were 
widely reported by the Chinese media, demonstrating that the Chinese government has both 









6. THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
How will the Chinese national identity evolve in the future? First of all, the Chinese 
government will pay more attention to crafting and promoting its international image. The 
2008 Tibet incident and the subsequent nationalist movement led the Chinese government to 
realize that it is important to communicate better with the public in the West. In an online 
dialogue with the Chinese netizens, Wu Jianming, China’s senior diplomat and the former 
president of China Foreign Affairs University pointed out: “The Chinese has its own jargon 
system, which could not be understood easily by the other peoples, and we might need to 
make some changes to the system” (Wu March 2009).  
Secondly, the transformation of the national identity also depends on the interaction 
between the government and public. Currently, there has been a debate about whether China 
should still hold onto the “pragmatic nationalism” and continue to keep a low profile on 
many issues. Some nationalists have been criticizing the government for being too 
accommodating to the big powers. One element of the neo-nationalism is the so-called “New 
Left of Academy,” a group which represents anti-Westernism and who feel it is time to 
“liberate the Chinese from their worship of Western modernization” (Xu 2002: 28). The 
book China Can Say No (zhongguo keyi shuo bu) published in 1994 is filled with such 
sentiments. The Unhappy China also urges the Chinese government to challenge the 
dominance of the U.S. In the eyes of many “new leftist” nationalists who voiced their 
opinions on the internet , the government has compromised the interests of the Chinese 
nation for the sake of economic benefits. Although China has achieved amazing economic 
success, the grievances arising from the economic inequality and social injustice has 
provoked disappointment – and the “new leftist” nationalists put the blame on the people 
who reaped the most economic benefits by supporting China’s integration into the global 
economy. For the “new leftists,” those privileged groups have been trying to avoid 
confrontation with the West in order to serve their own interests at the expense of the 
national interests.  
While the “new leftists,” or the so-called “fen qing” (angry youth), have attracted some 
supporters, their views have also provoked heated debate and strong criticism. The Unhappy 
China has been criticized as being naïve and unrealistic because it encourages confrontations 
between China and other countries. To its critics, it is unwise to demand that the Chinese 
government adopt a more aggressive attitude in international affairs (Tian 2009). Unlike 
most nationalists, they believe that the current economic crisis did not fundamentally change 
the relative power between China and the U.S., and now is certainly not the right moment for 
China to replace the U.S. to become a new leader of the world. Many are also worried that 
extreme nationalism will eventually become detrimental to China’s core interests. Siding 
with the government, these people believe that China should rely on its unique culture to 
help achieve peace and harmony in the world and try to maintain world peace and harmony. 
It is clear that with the social interests becoming more diversified, there will be more debates 
over the new Chinese national identity, especially among the well-educated social elite and 
policy makers. 
The Chinese government has been very careful not to let the nationalist sentiment run out 
of control in order to maintain domestic stability; it also wants to make sure that the 
nationalist sentiment does not disrupt the implementation of China’s grand strategy. 
Meanwhile, the government keeps a close watch on the public opinion concerning foreign 
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policy issues. The Chinese foreign policy decision-makers, including the former Chinese 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, are reaching out to the public by holding online dialogues 
with the netizens on major foreign affairs issues. One author has observed, “China’s foreign 
policy decision making body have developed various means to study, synthesize, and 
incorporate online public opinion” (Wu Xu 2007: 184).  
In the future the government will continue to adopt policies to fulfill the expectations of 
the public with regard to China’s elevated international status, and will adopt a more 
assertive attitude on certain issues. The Chinese government has demonstrated its resolve to 
build blue water Navy and even aircraft carriers, a decision that has won tremendous 
applause domestically. The USNS Impeccable incident in March 2009 also demonstrated 
that the Chinese government is assuming a more assertive stance in defending its maritime 
sovereignty. China will also be more likely to use its economic power to extend its influence. 
At the BRIC Summit in June 2009, the member states, in their Joint Statement, expressed 
their intention to advance the reform of international financial institutions and to demand a 
bigger voice and more representation in international institutions.  
In spite of these changes, the Chinese government will still pursue a pragmatic foreign 
policy that focuses primarily on economic development, and it will not seek to establish a 
national identity as a regional hegemon in the near future. At the Eleventh Sino-E.U. Summit 
in May 2009, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao criticized the concept of G2 and reiterated 
that China is still a developing country (Xinhua Net March 27, 2009). Under this policy, the 
Chinese government will continue to tame the nationalist sentiment and adopt a pragmatic 





A series of events that occurred between 2008 and 2009 mark a critical point in the 
transformation of the Chinese national identity. The rising of popular nationalism, a 
movement rooted in the Chinese public’s frustration with the West and its response to the 
rise of China, touches upon a number of issues that have to be addressed in forging a new 
national identity. To become a great power, China wants to keep the unity of the Chinese 
nation and maintain sovereignty over its vast territories; moreover, it needs to have its voice 
heard in the international community and demand respect from the other major powers.  
The Chinese government plays a leading role in shaping the new national identity 
through education, propaganda, and foreign policy implementation. The government and the 
public both hold the aspiration of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. The Chinese government 
has been very cautious not to present an aggressive international image, and it refrains from 
challenging the status quo power. Instead, it tries to create a national identity that is 
constructed on Confucian values that emphasize universal harmony. The public is very 
confident about China’s role in the world, and some nationalists are demanding that the 
government advance national interests in a more assertive manner. The Chinese government 
is becoming more responsive to the public, and the interaction between the government and 
the public will continue to impact the evolution of the new national identity.  
While China’s rising has caused some major changes in the balance of power in the 
international system, there is evidence suggesting that China is adopting liberal approaches 
by engaging more in international governmental organizations (Hempson-Jones 2005: 702). 
As Christensen points out, “China’s perspectives on international relations should provide 




practical lessons and cautionary warnings for foreigners as they seek to engage China in the 
economic, military, and political spheres” (Christensen 1999: 253). The Chinese national 
identity is undergoing major transformation, metamorphosing from “being a victim” to 
“being a great power.”  The changes in the perspectives of the Chinese government and 
public regarding China’s role in the world will profoundly shape China’s future foreign 
policy. Meanwhile, these perceptions are also formed based on the interaction between China 
and the rest of the world. Therefore how other nations, especially the other major powers, 
deal with China is also of great significance to China’s evolving new identity.  
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